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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of flow of foreign aid in the 20 ASIAN countries in a panel framework. The 
model includes the foreign aid, foreign direct investment, six measures of governance, along with the purely economic 
variables which have been taken as control variables. Estimation analysis was carried out by using pooled annual time 
series data from 2002 to 2008 in the framework of fixed and random effect model. Relevance of GMM (1991) and 
GMM (1998) estimates were also evaluated. We find that there is strong evidence of significantly positive impact of 
past year's aid flow and regulatory quality on the current year's aid flow while significantly negative impact of exports 
of goods and services, political stability and control over corruption on the current year's aid flow, weak evidence of 
the negative impact of population, voice and accountability, and rule of law on the current year's aid flow and weak 
evidence of significantly positive impact of government effectiveness on the current year's aid flow.
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     1.  Introduction 
The United States first recognized the Usefulness of foreign aid as a tool of diplomacy in the 
World War II. Policy makers believed that such a program will fulfill three important goals. 
First, to give assistance on humanitarian ground to the needy peoples, second, it would promote 
liberal capitalist models of development in other countries and third it would enhance national 
security.  And  the  contemporary  views  also  links  two  groups  the  donor  in  one  side  and  the 
recipients countries on the other. The donor countries has their own self interest in disbursing 
foreign aid it may be strategic, political and/or economic while recipients has their needs for 
removing  poverty,  improving  primary  education,  reducing  the  infant  mortality.  Available 
literature indicates that foreign aid definitely made a positive impact on economic growth but 
evidences are less clear-cut when we tries to find out what really determine the bilateral and 
multilateral disbursement of foreign aid. Donor countries and international agencies argue that 
their aid policies are meant to be selective and favor the reforming government. The  World 
Bank
1 has discussed openly about how to enhance good governance that is how to lower level of 
corruption of bureaucracy and of the official of the receiving countries and to enhance the level 
of governance World Bank is allocating aid to developing countries. This study is in the direction 
to identify the important factors which determine the aid allocation in the AISAN countries.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Second section presents an overview of the governance 
achievements  in  ASIAN  countries  followed  by  review  of  literature  in  third  section.  Fourth 
section presents methodology adopted for the analysis and the data source followed by empirical 
analysis in the fifth section. Sixth section concludes.  
2.  An overview of governance achievements and aid flow disbursement in the Asian 
countries 
An overview of the achievement in governance in the Asian countries is discussed here on the 
basis of the World Bank (2010) data on good governance. According to the World Bank (2010), 
the governance indicator score are measured between -2.50 and 2.50 over time with lower score 
indicating poor achievement and vice versa. The achievements in various indices of governance 
indicators in 20 ASIAN countries are presented in table 1a and 1b and the six dimension of 
governance are defined in the section 3. 
It is evident from table 1a and 1b that in the Armenia voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, control of corruption deteriorated constantly scoring point below zero. Whereas 
political stability and regulatory quality showed an improvement as it became positive in post 
2005 and regulatory quality in post 2002. In the case of China government effectiveness has 
improved  post  2005  scoring  positively  where  as  all  other  indicator  remaining  negative 
throughout. In the case of Georgia government effectiveness and regulatory quality showed an 
improving trend having a positive score while other indicator deteriorated further whereas India 
shows positive scores on voice and accountability and Rule of law throughout the period from 
2002 to 2008 while other indicator still remains negative. All the six measures show a negative 
trend for Indonesia throughout the period whereas Jordan reveals a unique picture as out of six 
indicators four indicators reaming positive throughout and only voice and accountability and 
political stability showing a negative trend. Kazakhstan shows a negative score throughout the 
period indicating no improvement at all whilst Laos being indifferent. Lebanon and Pakistan also 
did not show any positive score for any of the indicator throughout the period of 2002 to 2008. In 
Philippians Voice and accountability score was positive in the period of 2002 and 2005 but 
                                                           
1 For instance see, world bank 1997 became negative in 2008 and government effectiveness in 2008 become zero, while all other 
remains  negative.  Tajikstan,  Turknenis,  Uzbekistan  all  shows  a  negative  trend  in  the 
achievement  of  good  governance.  In  the  case  of  the  Thailand  voice  and  accountability  was 
positive in 2002 and 2005 but became negative in 2008 and political stability showed a positive 
score  in  2002 but  deteriorated  and  became negative  in  2005  and  2008  whereas  government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality remain positive in Thailand. Rule of law was positive in 
2002 and 2005  but became  negative  in  2008 whereas  control of  corruption  was  below  zero 
throughout. In Turkey government effectiveness and regulatory quality both shows positive score 
but regulatory quality shows a remarkable improvement. In Vietnam political stability shows a 
positive score and improvement but all other indicator are below zero and on a deteriorating 
trend. 
Now if we focus on aid flow in ASIAN countries we will find that aid as a percentage of GDP 
for most of the Asian countries shows a declining trend with exception in the case of Georgia 
and Lebanon, where aid as percentage of GDP increased from 2005 to 2008 to some extent. 
Bangladesh and Armenia recorded a small increased in aid as a percentage of GDP from 2005 to 
2008  whereas  Thailand  shows  a  unique  picture  where  aid  as  percentage  of  GDP  became 
negative. 
3.  A review of literature on aid and governance 
If  we  consider  the  literature  relating  to  the  connections  between  aid  and  governance  it  is 
somewhat scarce. However, the literature on the role of governance as the economic growth 
determinant  is  growing  over  years.  We  will  present  a  brief  review  of  literature  relating  to 
governance, growth and aid allocation. North (1990) has extensively emphasised the role played 
by institutions in the process of economic progress and governance is an essential component of 
the new institutional economics. The study by Coase (1998) and Rutherford (2001) show that 
institutions are fundamental to the effective functioning of market-based economies and of late 
studies provide empirical support in this aspect also. For example, Sala-i-Martin (1997) have 
discussed the role of the institutions on the level of competition and government regulation of 
markets; Hall and Jones (1999) discussed on the role of institutions on total factor productivity 
and Keefer and Knack (1997) have focused on the role of property rights and the rule of law as 
institutions. Though, achievements in good governance vary from country to country as noted in 
Kaufmann et al. (2004) yet the swiftness of improvements in governance certainly matters for 
integration  in  the  world  economy.  Countries  engaged  in  improving  the  dimensions  that 
contribute to good governance are likely to improve their economic growth. 
The link between aid and governance is an issue that requires more rigorous investigation. The 
literature in this area is scarce. However, some studies find that the increasing in the institutional 
quality enhances the process of economic growth and development. For example by maintaining 
a fair and efficient public sector administration, low corruption, effective law enforcement and 
sound regulation can bring enhanced growth prospects. Corruption is another element that can 
influence the economic performance of nations to a greater extent. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and 
Wei (2000) conclude that high trade intensity and or small populations are associated with lower 
corruption  levels.  Further,  Anderson  (2001)  suggested  that  the  ill  functioning  of  institutions 
increases both costs and risks of trading abroad and extending this Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002) provided the empirical evidence where deterioration in the quality of institutions reduces 
foreign  demand.  There  are  some  studies  which  have  highlighted  that  institutions  affect 
development process of nations indirectly through their impact on other variables that determine 
the process of economic growth. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) and Olson et al. (2000) mentioned that deficient institutions impact productivity and growth and that lower productivity 
is an impediment to competitiveness which is likely to have negative effects on trade. Similarly, 
Mauro (1995) discussed on the role of corruption on the economic growth; Gould and Gruben 
(1996) noted on the role of intellectual property rights on economic  growth; Safavian et  al. 
(2001)  discussed  about  the  impact  of  regulatory  interruption  into  enterprise  activities;  Barro 
(2001) discussed on the relationship between the rule of law and economic growth; Fischer et al. 
(2001)  discussed  on  the  relationship  between  bureaucratic  inefficiency  and  financial 
mismanagement;  Djankov  et  al.  (2002)  on  the  relationship  between  regulation  of  entry  and 
corruption; and last but not least Tiwari (2010) discussed on the impact of various governance 
indicators on the economic growth.  
4.  Econometric analysis of the quality of governance, economic freedom and economic 
growth 
4.1 Model, Data source and Variables definition  
This study focuses on finding out the aid flow determinants among 20 ASIAN countries
2 in 
panel framework for the period 2002-2007. In this study we assume that aid flow depends upon 
(a) various forms of Good Governance (GGOV), as well as (b) a number of purely Economic 
Factors (EF) following Mosley et al. (2004) and Gani (2009) but extending the both models. In 
this study we have preferred panel data analysis technique as it has an advantage of containing 
“the information necessary to deal with both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of 
the entities being investigated” (Dielman, 1989). The most commonly used ways of assessing the 
relationship between aid flow and its determinants is the static panel data models.  There are 
basically  three  types  of  panel  data  models  namely,  a  pooled  Ordinary  Least  Squire  (OLS) 
regression, panel model with random effects and panel model with fixed effects. The evaluation 
of a pooled OLS regression can be specified as follows: 
) 1 ......( ,......... ) ( ) ( 2 1 0 it it it it GGOV EF AID e b b b + + + =  
where i represents country, t represents time, GGOVit comprises five dimension to measure good 
governance, EFit comprises variables that are purely economic and these variables we have taken 
as  control  variables  and  the  remainder  is  error  term  which  is  assumed  to  have  a  normal 
distribution and varies over both country and time it e .  In this study we define governance as the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. In this study the five 
dimensions of governance through which it will be measured are: Voice and Accountability (VA), 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS-AV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory 
Quality (RQ), and Control of Corruption (CC). Where VA captures the perceptions of the extent 
to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. PS-AV captures the perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent  means,  including  politically-motivated  violence  and  terrorism.  GE  captures  the 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. RQ captures the perceptions of 
                                                           
2 List of the countries included for the analysis is presented in appendix along with the descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis.  the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. And CC captures the perceptions of the extent to 
which  public  power  is  exercised  for  private  gain,  including  both  petty  and  grand  forms  of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Following the related 
literature to date, it is expected (ceteris paribus) that economic growth is an increasing function 
of  each  one  of  these  measures  of  governance.  According  to  The  World  Bank  (2007),  the 
governance indicator scores are measured between -2.50 and 2.50 over time with lower scores 
indicating poor achievements and vice versa.  
Finally, we have taken some purely economic variable i.e., EFit, to control for their impact on the 
economic  growth.  These  variables  are  LRIP,  the  nominal  long  term  Interest  payments  on 
external debt; the total population; and EGS, nominal exports of goods and services, expressed as 
a percent of GDP and changed in to natural logarithms (following Cebula 1995; Barro 1997); 
nominal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is expressed as a percent of GDP and a measure of 
economic  growth  rate  measured  by  GDP  growth  rate.  Presumably,  aid  flow  is  a  increasing 
function of LRIP since a higher burden of long term Interest payments on external debt acts to 
demand  for  more  and  more  aid,  ceteris  paribus.  Similarly,  a  higher  population  also  forces 
nations to demand for more and more aid in order to provide long and healthy life. Likewise, 
higher EGS implies greater rate of real domestic production, ceteris paribus. Finally, higher FDI 
inflow is assumed to be growth generating. For all variables data has been obtained from the 
official website of World Bank of World Development Indicators (WDI) and was accessed on 
May  2010.  By  incorporating  the  five  dimensions  of  good  governance  and  control  variables 
equation (1) can be specified as follows: 
) 2 ......( ,......... ) ( ) (
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However, while using a pooled OLS regression, countries’ unobservable individual effects are 
not  controlled  therefore;  heterogeneity  of  the  countries  under  consideration  for  analysis  can 
influence measurements of the estimated parameters (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Further, using a 
panel data model with incorporation of individual effects has a number of benefits for example, 
among others; it allows us to account for individual heterogeneity. Indeed, developing countries 
differ in terms of their colonial history, their political regimes, their ideologies and religious 
affiliations, their geographical locations and climatic conditions, not to mention a wide range of 
other country-specific variables (Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2008). And if this heterogeneity is not 
taken  into  account  it  will  inevitably  bias  the  results,  no  matter  how  large  the  sample  is. 
Therefore, by incorporating countries’ unobservable individual effects in equation (4) the model 
to be estimated is as follows:  
) 3 ......( ,......... ) ( ) (
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where  , it i it w e m + = with  i m being  countries’  unobservable  individual  effects.  The  difference 
between a polled OLS regression and a model considering unobservable individual effects lies 
precisely in i m . 
To test the relevance of unobservable individual effects we use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test. This tests the null hypothesis of irrelevance of unobservable individual effects, against the 
alternative hypothesis of relevance of unobservable individual effects. If the null hypothesis is 
not rejected this will implies that unobservable individual effects are not relevant, and therefore, 
a  pooled  OLS  regression  is  an  appropriate  way  of  carrying  out  evaluation  of  aid  flow determinants. On the contrary, if we reject the null hypothesis of irrelevance of unobservable 
individual effects, we can conclude that a pooled OLS regression is not the most appropriate way 
of  carrying  out  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  aid  flow  and  its  determinants  i.e., 
unobservable individual effects are of relevance and should be incorporated in the analysis.  
However, there may be correlation between countries’ unobservable individual effects and aid 
flow determinants. If there is no correlation between countries’ unobservable individual effects 
and aid flow determinants, the most appropriate way of carrying out analysis is using a panel 
model of random effects. On the contrary, if there is correlation between countries’ individual 
effects and aid flow determinants, the most appropriate way of carrying out analysis is using a 
panel  model  of  fixed  effects.  To  test  for  the  possible  existence  of  correlation  we  use  the 
Hausman test. Hausman test tests the null hypothesis of non-existence of correlation between 
unobservable individual effects and the aid flow determinants, against the alternative hypothesis 
of existence of correlation. If the null hypothesis is not rejected we can conclude that correlation 
is not relevant and therefore a panel model of random effects being the most correct way of 
carrying  out  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  aid  flow  and  its  determinants.  On  the 
contrary,  if  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  we  can  conclude  that  correlation  is  relevant  and 
therefore a panel model of fixed effects being the most appropriate way to carrying out analysis 
of the relationship between aid flow its determinants.  
Further, it is important to be mentioned is that static panel (with or without fixed and random 
effects) models do not allow us to analyze the possible dynamism existing in country aid flow 
determinants. Study by Gani (2009) assumes economic growth is an exogenous variable, even 
though economic growth is expected to be endogenous in growth regressions. Addition to that, 
economic  growth  may  present  issues  of  reverse  causality  for  example,  if  economic  growth 
depends on the any of the aid flow determinant variable, it will necessarily depend on aid flow 
and if this kind of reverse causality is not taken into account, it can lead to serious inaccuracies 
in  research  results.  In  such  a  situation  it  is  not  only  that  the  parameter  estimates  will  be 
inconsistent (because error term of the growth equation may include factors that both affect aid 
flow and are correlated with economic growth) but also the magnitude and the meaning of the 
economic growth parameter will also get altered as well. Therefore, I have employed Arellano 
and Bond’s Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)-type estimator (1991) also to deal with the 
issue of endogenity in the context of panel data models. In the dynamic framework equation (5) 
can be written as follows: 
) 4 ......( ,......... ) ( ) ( ) (
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The GMM-type estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is also known as two-step 
estimation process and are constructed in two phases. Firstly, first differences from the dynamic 
panel data model are calculated; then, lagged levels of right-hand side variables are used as their 
instruments. With a lagged dependent variable and other endogenous regressors (as is the case 
with aid and aid squared), the lagged levels are dated t-2 and earlier (t indexes time). If there are 
predetermined  regressors,  all  their  lagged  levels  are  used  as  instruments.  Evaluation  of  the 
equation  (4)  in  first  differences  allows  us  to  eliminate  unobservable  individual  effects, 
eliminating in this way the correlation between  i m  and AIDit-1. The use of lags of the growth and 
its determinants as instruments allows for the creation of orthogonal conditions between  it e and 
AIDit-1 i.e., eliminating correlation between  it e and AIDit-1. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) conclude that when the dependent variable is persistent i.e., 
there being a high correlation between its values in the current period and in the previous period, 
and the number of periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is inefficient. For this 
kind  of  situations  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  have  extend  the  GMM  (1991)  estimator  by 
considering a system with variables at level and first differences. For the variables at level in 
equation  (4)  the  instruments  are  the  variables  lagged  in  first  differences.  In  the  case  of  the 
variables in first differences in equation (6) the instruments are those lagged variables at level. 
However, the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators can only be considered 
robust if, firstly the restrictions created as a consequence of using the instruments are valid and 
secondly there is absence of second order autocorrelation. To test the validity of the restrictions 
we use the Sargan test in the case of the GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) estimator. In both cases, 
the null hypothesis is the restrictions imposed by use of the instruments are valid against the 
alternative hypothesis that the restrictions are not valid. If the null hypothesis is rejected we can 
infer that the estimators are not robust since restrictions imposed by use of instrument are not 
valid. And to test for the existence of first and second order autocorrelation we use Arellano and 
Bond (1991) test. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation against the alternative 
hypothesis being the existence of autocorrelation. And if the null hypothesis of non-existence of 
second order autocorrelation is rejected we conclude that the estimators are not robust. 
5.  Estimation and Empirical Results 
Results of static panel data models and dynamic panel data models have been presented in table 
3.  
From  table  3,  it  is  evident  that  the  results  of  the  Wald  test  are  significant  at  5%  level  of 
significance in static panel data model and at 1% level of significance at dynamic panel data 
model and F tests are significant at 1% level of significance in both the static panel and dynamic 
panel data models therefore we can conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
explanatory variables do not explain (taken as a whole) the explained variable, and hence the 
determinants selected in this study can be considered to be enough explanatory of the aid flow 
determinent. Further, the LM test indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of irrelevance of 
unobservable  individual  effects  at  1%  significance  level  that  implies  that  a  pooled  OLS 
regression  will  not  be  the  most appropriate  way  of  carrying  out  analysis of  the  relationship 
between aid flow and its determinants i.e., country specific heterogeneity is playing significant 
role on the aid flow therefore, it should be incorporated in our model. Though is case of the 
Hausman test we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between countries’ 
unobservable  individual  effects  and  aid  flow  determinants  yet  in  this  case  we  find  that  the 
assumption of Hausman test are not fulfilled. Therefore, analysis of the relationship between aid 
flow and its determinants is a panel model with fixed effects and in the presence of first order 
autoregressive scheme has been carried out and results are presented under model 4. It is evident 
from the results of model 4 that GDP growths, PS, RL and CC have significantly negative impact 
on the aid flow while RQ has significantly positive impact on the aid flow.  
In the next step we present the results of the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic 
estimators. The results of GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) have been under model 5 and model 6. 
In this case also the results of the Wald test in both models shows that the determinants used in 
this study can be considered, as a whole, explanatory of the aid flow as Wald test is significant at 
1% level of significance. Further, as the Sargan test is not significant in all models therefore we 
can  conclude  that  data  do  not  provide  evidence  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  instrument 
validity and consequent restrictions generated from use of the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators respectively i.e., instruments and restrictions generated from use of 
GMM (1991) and GMM (1998)  are valid. Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation 
shows that in all models data do not provide evidence to reject the null hypothesis of absence of 
first  and  second  order  autocorrelation.  Therefore,  given  the  validity  of  the  instruments  and 
restriction  imposed  by  GMM  (1991)  and  GMM  (1998)  and  absence  of  second  order 
autocorrelation,  we  can  conclude  that  the  GMM  (1991)  and  GMM  system  (1998)  dynamic 
estimators are efficient and robust. But if we see the results obtained from both the models we 
find  wide  difference.  For  instance,  population  is  insignificant  in  case  of  GMM  (1991)  but 
significant  in  GMM  (1998);  VA,  GE  and  RL  are  significant  in  case  of  GMM  (1991)  but 
insignificant in case of GMM (1998).  
6.  Conclusions   
In the present study we extended the literature which analysis the importance of governance that 
is institutions in determining the flow of aid in 20 ASIAN countries in the framework of panel 
data analysis. For the analysis we adopt fixed effect and random effect model since Hausman test 
failed to provide the choice between these two we analysed the dynamic panel data models. 
Though, there is inconsistency on the results reported by GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) models 
we can conclude on the basis of whole analysis that there is strong evidence of significantly 
positive impact of past year aid flow and regulatory quality on the current year aid flow while 
significantly negative impact of exports of goods and services, political stability and control over 
corruption on the aid flow. Further, we find that these is weak evidence of  negative impact of 
population, voice and accountability, and rule of law whereas government effectiveness is found 
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Table 1a: Governance indicators  
countries  Voice and accountability  Political stability  Government effectiveness 
  2002  2005  2008  2002  2005  2008  2002  2005  2008 
Armenia  -0.56  -0.58  -0.66  -0.81  -0.21  0.01  -0.22  -0.09  -0.07 
Azerbaijan  -0.89  -1.03  -1.23  -1.13  -1.17  -0.48  -0.87  -0.63  -0.64 
Bangladesh  -0.45  -0.52  -0.61  -0.85  -1.61  -1.54  -0.73  -0.84  -0.77 
China(pR)  -1.58  -1.52  -1.72  -0.18  -0.25  -0.32  -0.01  -0.12  0.24 
Georgia  -0.5  -0.16  -0.25  -1.47  -0.68  -1  -0.76  -0.44  0.18 
India  0.38  0.42  0.45  -0.98  -0.74  -0.99  -0.17  -0.12  -0.03 
Indonesia  -0.41  -0.18  -0.14  -1.61  -1.25  -1  -0.63  -0.46  -0.29 
Jordan  -0.77  -0.49  -0.71  -0.47  -0.29  -0.32  0.13  0.06  0.27 
Kazakhstan  -1.13  -0.94  -1.01  0.13  0.01  0.51  -0.88  -0.56  -0.47 
Kyrgyz star  -1  -0.8  -0.72  -1.03  -1.09  -0.68  -0.65  -0.8  -0.7 
Laos  -1.75  -1.67  -1.71  -0.26  -0.28  -0.01  -0.74  -1.01  -0.84 
Lebanon  -0.74  -0.34  -0.4  -0.72  -1.18  -1.94  -0.25  -0.28  -0.64 
Pakistan  -1.19  -1.05  -1.01  -1.56  -1.7  -2.61  -0.59  -0.55  -0.73 
Philippines  0.14  0.03  -0.2  -0.66  -1.05  -1.41  -0.17  -0.11  0 
Tajikistan  -1.25  -1.16  -1.32  -1.37  -1.34  -0.74  -1.18  -0.99  -0.88 
Thailand  0.34  0.03  -0.56  0.38  -0.6  -1.19  0.17  0.36  0.11 
Turkey  -0.28  -0.05  -0.19  -1  -0.53  -0.73  0.05  0.2  0.2 
Turknenis  -1.93  -1.99  -2.06  -0.4  -0.26  0.23  -1.36  -1.42  -1.16 
Uzbekistan  -1.66  -1.82  -1.9  -1.21  -1.8  -0.91  -1.12  -1.1  -0.68 
Vietnam  -1.5  -1.43  -1.62  0.33  0.37  0.32  -0.46  -0.3  -0.31 
 
Table 1b: Governance indicators  
   Regulatory quality  Rule of law  Control of corruption 
countries  2002  2005  2008  2002  2005  2008  2002  2005  2008 
Armenia  -0.08  0.11  0.32  -0.51  -0.5  -0.36  -0.7  -0.61  -0.54 
Azerbaijan  -0.69  -0.53  -0.32  -0.87  -0.79  -0.76  -0.99  -0.97  -1 
Bangladesh  -0.94  -0.95  -0.82  -0.77  -0.83  -0.7  -1.08  -1.31  -1.1 
China(pR)  -0.52  -0.26  -0.22  -0.36  -0.41  -0.33  -0.41  -0.67  -0.44 
Georgia  -0.84  -0.56  0.59  -1.27  -0.78  -0.34  -1.16  -0.4  -0.23 
India  -0.36  -0.21  -0.21  0.03  0.18  0.12  -0.44  -0.34  -0.37 
Indonesia  -0.71  -0.48  -0.27  -1.01  -0.84  -0.66  -1.13  -0.87  -0.64 
Jordan  0.09  0.25  0.34  0.21  0.44  0.49  0.06  0.34  0.41 
Kazakhstan  -0.82  -0.46  -0.37  -1  -0.78  -0.78  -1.08  -0.89  -0.95 
Kyrgyz star  -0.17  -0.72  -0.32  -0.75  -1.05  -1.26  -0.81  -1.1  -1.06 
Laos  -1.31  -1.2  -1.25  -1.08  -1.1  -0.9  -0.92  -1.16  -1.23 
Lebanon  -0.33  -0.19  -0.2  -0.29  -0.35  -0.73  -0.4  -0.5  -0.83 
Pakistan  -0.8  -0.59  -0.47  -0.79  -0.89  -0.92  -0.81  -0.99  -0.77 
Philippines  -0.1  -0.05  -0.05  -0.52  -0.42  -0.49  -0.52  -0.64  -0.75 
Tajikistan  -1.3  -1.04  -0.97  -1.22  -0.93  -1.12  -1.06  -1.09  -0.99 
Thailand  0.15  0.41  0.26  0.25  0.11  -0.03  -0.33  -0.13  -0.38 
Turkey  0.04  0.18  0.22  -0.13  0.11  0.09  -0.46  0.01  0.1 
Turknenis  -1.95  -2.07  -2.03  -1.16  -1.4  -1.3  -1.23  -1.35  -1.34 
Uzbekistan  -1.55  -1.71  -1.41  -1.4  -1.39  -1.18  -1  -1.17  -1.08 
Vietnam  -0.71  -0.58  -0.53  -0.54  -0.33  -0.43  -0.7  -0.8  -0.76 
  
 
Table 2: Aid flow in ASIAN countries  
Net official development assistance and official 
aid received (constant 2007 US$) 
Aid as a percentage of GDP 
 
countries  2002  2005  2008  2002  2005  2008 
Armenia  4.01E+08  1.88E+08  2.86E+08  4.575659  1.500219  1.655723 
Azerbaijan  4.3E+08  2.41E+08  2.22E+08  1.7652  0.63974  0.315187 
Bangladesh  1.28E+09  1.48E+09  1.98E+09  0.929454  0.906362  1.005356 
china(pR)  1.84E+09  1.83E+09  1.41E+09  0.046382  0.034517  0.019238 
Georgia  4.1E+08  3.24E+08  8.49E+08  3.351167  2.056931  4.299439 
India  1.87E+09  1.94E+09  2.03E+09  0.098178  0.079193  0.065554 
Indonesia  1.65E+09  2.59E+09  1.2E+09  0.272901  0.367236  0.143341 
Jordan  7.08E+08  7.2E+08  7.17E+08  3.676723  3.060327  2.402813 
Kazakhstan  2.48E+08  2.44E+08  3.15E+08  0.247097  0.185306  0.192046 
Kyrgyz star  2.52E+08  2.99E+08  3.4E+08  3.239187  3.363943  3.176365 
Laos  3.73E+08  3.28E+08  4.68E+08  4.641246  3.38062  3.842333 
Lebanon  6.39E+08  2.72E+08  1.01E+09  1.840508  0.699334  2.219056 
Pakistan  2.86E+09  1.78E+09  1.49E+09  1.019685  0.524314  0.383386 
Philippines  6.9E+08  5.8E+08  79640000  0.323007  0.231781  0.027171 
Tajikistan  2.12E+08  2.76E+08  2.76E+08  2.855863  2.857772  2.292513 
Thailand  3.22E+08  -1.2E+08  -5.4E+08  0.086235  -0.02769  -0.10762 
Turkey  5.85E+08  4.71E+08  1.87E+09  0.093468  0.060328  0.211597 
Turknenis  51540000  34830000  16490000  0.353537  0.154057  0.053431 
Uzbekistan  2.4E+08  1.78E+08  1.75E+08  0.54933  0.340226  0.26065 




















 Table 3: Regression results of first specification  
Panel data Models: Dependent variable Aid per capita  
Independent variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
FE  FE@  RE  FE@ with AR(1)  GMM (1991)  GMM (1998) 
Aid per capita (-1)  --------  ------------  ---------------  ------------- 
0.3316103*** 
[0.0093449] 
0 .4195553***  















































































































































(11.71236 )        
AR(I)  --------  ------------  ---------- 
0.168603 
(0.111975)  --------------  ------------ 
Model summary 
R
2   0.826317  0.931892  0.147901  0.920892  --------  --------- 
Arellano-Bond test  
-------------  --------------  --------------  ---------------  Z1= -1.307 
Z2= 1.1957 
Z1= -1.3249  
Z2= 0.8402  
DW  1.603004  1.773109  1.278302  1.800374  -------------  ----------- 
Sargan test  ---------  ------------  ---------------  -------------  chi2(14)=  6.644  chi2(19)=  8.32 
LM 
---------  ------------  chi2(1) =    
85.36*** 
-----------  ---------  ------------ 
Wald chi
2  -------  -------  22.39**  23.71**  87886.09***  77997.82*** 
F-test  18.04609***  51.8991***  2.239084**  34.53499***  --------  -------- 
Hausman test      -0.84       
Fixed effect(F-test) 
F(19, 110) = 
12.29*** 
-----------  ------------  -----------  F(5,45)= 25.17***  ---------- 
Cross-sections included  20  20  20  20  20  20 
Total panel observations  140  140  140  140  140  140 
Notes: 1. The LM test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are irrelevant in explaining the 
dependent variable, against the alternative hypothesis of relevance of unobservable individual effects in explaining the dependent variable. 2. 
The Hausman test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory 
variables, against the null hypothesis of correlation between unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables. 3. The Wald test has 
χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables, against the alternative 
hypothesis of significance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4. The F test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the 
null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the estimated parameters, against the alternative hypothesis of significance as a whole of the 
estimated parameters. 5. ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance respectively. 6. The Sargan test has χ2 
distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity 
of the instruments used. 7. The Z1 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, 
against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first order autocorrelation. 8. The Z2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null 
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 9. EF, CS, 
BP-LM,  SD  denotes  fixed-effect,  cross-section,  Breusch  and  Pagan’s  Lagrange  multiplier  for  random  effect,  and  standard  deviation 
respectively. 10. [----] denotes results are not computed. 11. @ denotes that model is estimated with Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR) method. 








  AIDPC 
GDP 
growth  EGS  Interest Population  VA  PS  GE  RQ  RL  CC 
 Mean   38.69078   7.941837   6.49E+10   1.49E+09   1.66E+08  -0.8306  -0.8115  -0.440  -0.5174 -0.6221  -0.721643 
 Median   15.24296   7.421355   9.66E+09   2.49E+08   20473317  -0.7150  -0.8850 -0.46500 -0.44500 -0.7450  -0.795000 
 Maximum   279.2990   34.50000   1.00E+12   1.12E+10   1.32E+09   0.4700   0.5100   0.36000   0.59000  0.5100   0.440000 
 Minimum  -13.54016 -0.175548   45265296   10551000   3059964.  -2.1100  -2.6100  -1.4200  -2.1900 -1.4100  -1.420000 
 Std. Dev.   51.64651   4.467341   1.66E+11   2.13E+09   3.52E+08   0.6663   0.6416   0.43425   0.60483  0.4814   0.418106 
 Skewness   2.201800   2.395608   4.230548   1.835529   2.571804  -0.0241  -0.0666  -0.0615  -0.7285  0.5028   0.832062 
 Kurtosis   8.502143   13.65415   20.98201   6.753991   7.984014   2.0798   2.6453   2.07458   3.1393  2.4686   3.314563 
 Jarque-
Bera   289.7141   796.0554   2303.833   160.8198   299.2331   4.9532   0.8373   5.08399   12.4968  7.5458   16.73152 




  AIDPC 
GDP 
Growth  EGS  Interest  Population  VA  PS  GE  RQ  RL  CC 
AIDPC  1                     
GDP 
Growth  -0.060  1                   
EGS  -0.2607  0.08090  1                 
Interest  -0.33367  -0.19448  0.44957  1               
Population  -0.31421  0.04368  0.79660  0.525303  1             
VA  0.07945  -0.27299  -0.1114  0.453664  0.117462  1           
PS  -0.0287  0.22802  0.17575  0.00606  0.061198  -0.234  1         
GE  0.107389  -0.176281  0.37442  0.538754  0.3429165  0.6120  0.21710  1       
RQ  0.28507  -0.17503  0.17081  0.382665  0.131877  0.6987  0.096462  0.89516  1     
RL  0.15099  -0.155741  0.22368  0.465728  0.3183861  0.6053  0.2499023  0.90062  0.80924  1   
CC  0.2749  -0.16841  0.19156  0.434326  0.2092778  0.5156  0.1935270  0.87152  0.77934  0.90487736  1 
 
 
List of countries included in the analysis        
Armenia  Georgia  Kazakhstan  Sri Lanka  Turkmenistan  Pakistan 
Azerbaijan  India  Kyrgyzstan  Syria  Malaysia  Uzbekistan 
Bangladesh  Indonesia  Lebanon  Tajikistan  Mongolia  Vietnam 
Cambodia  Iran  Philippines  Thailand  Nepal   
China (PRC)  Jordan  Saudi Arabia  Turkey  Oman   